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Executive Summary 
This Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH) case study encourages critical 
analysis of a U.S. Defense Department project at two key decision points: project 
start and production. The case centers on the development, testing, and 
procurement (also referred to as acquisition) of the ECH for U.S. Army Soldiers and 
U.S. Marines. Two things make this case study particularly interesting. First is that 
key project stakeholders are passionate about helmets because they save lives in 
combat and all Soldiers and Marines consider themselves subject matter experts on 
helmets—resulting in wide applicability. Second is the fact that the key decisions 
involved with the ECH effort involved ambiguous data within a complex acquisition 
environment—requiring decision making under uncertainty. The ECH case study 
reinforces critical thinking in uncertain environments, documents lessons learned for 
sound project management for future application, and provides wide private sector 
exposure to the complexities of public sector acquisition and helmet manufacture in 
particular. 
The following are the learning objectives for this case study: 
• Develop the ability to critically analyze a project at key decision points—
critical thinking. 
• Identify key stakeholders and outline their contribution to the pending 
decision—stakeholder management. 
• Develop alternative recommended strategies or courses of action for the 
decision maker—decision making with uncertainly or ambiguous data. 
• Compare alternative strategies and identify decision criteria used for the 
comparison—decision making with uncertainly or ambiguous data. 
• Identify second-order considerations or consequences of the 
recommended strategies—strategic management/leadership.  
The efforts to modernize helmets face the same defense acquisition 
challenges that all programs within the Department of Defense (DOD) face: a 
complex, bureaucratic defense acquisition institution, accelerated pace of 
technology innovation, technology immaturity, rapidly evolving threats, unstable 
requirements, and declining defense budgets leading to unstable funding. However, 
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the protection of Soldiers and Marines in combat remains a top priority for senior 
leaders in the Services, DOD, and Congress. The DOD has committed considerable 
resources and funding over the years in research and development, resulting in 
advanced materials and manufacturing processes. The American Soldier and 
Marine going into battle today has technologically advanced, rigorously tested 
combat equipment. This case study centers on combat helmets, which provide 
Soldiers skull and brain protection against both ballistic threats (i.e., bullets) and 
blunt impact forces, and prevent mild traumatic brain injury and concussions. The 
combat helmets that Soldiers and Marines wear into battle show a constant 
improvement in performance over time. This improvement in performance has been 
the result of advances in material research and manufacturing techniques. Advances 
in material research provided the opportunity to increase ballistic protection at a 
reduced weight. The ballistic aramid technology allowed helmets to provide not only 
fragmentation protection from explosions but also small caliber hand gun protection 
at a reasonable weight. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. Army Research 
Lab, the U.S. Army Research Development and Engineering Command, and 
commercial industry teamed to mature the next generation of ballistics materials, 
resulting in the development of high molecular weight polyethylene (HMWPE) 
ballistics fibers that could be weaved into fabrics with application to combat 
helmets—resulting in reduced weight and greater ballistic capability. The application 
of HMWPE to helmets allowed the Army to consider the following basic options for 
the new helmet requirements: (1) maintain the protection levels of the current 
helmets with a reduced weight of up to 20% or (2) increase the protection levels but 
maintain (or increase) the weight of the helmet. 
Part 1 of the case focuses on the decision to initiate the ECH program. 
Guidance from the warfighting community and senior leaders was clear: the top 
priorities were maximum protection and weight reduction. Specifically, the ECH had 
to address the rifle threat, be fielded as quickly as possible, and reduce the weight 
on Soldiers and Marines in combat. In this part of the case, program management 
professionals can compare the various courses of actions developed for the initiation 
of an ECH effort with the actual ECH program. Valuable insights can be gleaned as 
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lessons learned. It may be possible to avoid strategy pitfalls, and project 
management teams may be better able to manage cost, schedule and performance 
trade-offs—and ultimately deliver capability more successfully. Questions to 
consider include the following: 
• Who are the key stakeholders in the ECH program initiation decision and 
how should their expectations be managed? 
• Would the ECH program be considered a “technology push” or “capability 
pull” program, and what are the implications? 
• How should the ECH requirements be set? Should increased protection or 
weight reduction be emphasized? What is the right balance between 
reductions of Soldier load (combat weight) versus greater Soldier 
protection? 
• How does the Army set testing protocols for the ECH prior to development 
and manufacturing of a helmet based on a new technology? 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of various acquisition 
approaches for the development, testing, procurement, and fielding of the 
ECH? What are the criteria used to compare the alternative approaches? 
Part 1 of the case offers key fundamental defense acquisition and program 
management lessons, which include the following: 
• All programs are held to the constraints of cost, schedule, and 
performance. However, programs that involve the application of a new 
technology inherently include high levels of integration, manufacturability, 
producibility, and quality risk. These programs should guard against being 
primarily schedule-driven. Time is required to optimize the requirements 
and testing protocols and allow the widest possible participation in the 
program by interested and innovative manufacturers. In this case, an effort 
that originally planned to field helmets within a year was seeking a 
production decision almost fours year later. The industrial base suffered 
as the program settled on a sole-source contracting strategy without the 
benefits of competition to keep costs and schedules in check. A program 
that is knowledge-driven from a research and development effort that 
includes many competitors from the industrial base may have proven 
more beneficial, and may have had a similar actual schedule timeline. 
• Project managers (PMs), decision makers, and senior leaders should be 
realistic about the risks associated with development efforts that are 
primarily schedule-driven rather than knowledge-driven. 
Part 2 of the ECH case study focuses on the decision to actually procure and 
field the helmets to Soldiers and Marines despite the objections of the testing and 
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medical communities. The ECH program began in early 2009. The Army and the 
Marine Corps approved urgent requirements based on combat operations and the 
need for increased protection against enemy rifle threats. The Army and USMC set 
broad requirements to include a 35 percent increase in fragmentation protection, 
increased 9mm pistol protection, and rifle threat protection—all at the same weight 
of the current helmet. After passing testing and four years after program initiation, in 
the summer of 2013, the ECH was ready for a full rate production decision. The 
decision would involve significant procurement money to buy and field the ECH. 
Despite passing testing against the requirements, senior leaders faced a difficult 
decision because not all key stakeholders interpreted the test results similarly, 
raising significant safety concerns. Specifically, the testing and medical communities 
believed that the ECH was not operationally effective or operationally suitable for 
fielding and that the risk of injury to Soldiers and Marines was unacceptable—
Soldiers and Marines wearing the ECH could suffer life-threatening skull fractures. 
Questions to consider include the following: 
• Who were the key stakeholders and how should their expectations be 
managed?  
• How does the Army balance the importance of development test data 
versus field data from helmets that were battle damaged? Should 
developmental test results or field data carry more weight in decision-
making? How can the same development test data be interpreted 
differently by stakeholders? 
• Are the concerns of the testing and medical communities warranted? 
• How does the Army address these concerns with Congress, the media, 
and the American public? 
• What are the advantages, disadvantages, and second order implications 
of various courses of actions for the path forward? What are the decision 
criteria? 
• How do you quantify benefits, such as saving a Soldier’s life, and compare 
these benefits with long-term, potential health problems like concussions 
or muscular-skeletal neck injuries from the weight of helmets? 
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Part 2 of the case offers key fundamental defense acquisition and program 
management lessons, which include the following: 
• Test data can be interpreted differently by key stakeholders—leading to 
ambiguity in the decision making process. The PM is in a position to 
understand not only the business side of the project (cost and schedule) 
but also the engineering side of the project (technology, testing, and risks). 
With this knowledge, the PM needs to try to reduce the uncertainty 
associated with the test data and present an interpretation in an unbiased, 
rational manner. 
• The extension of test data obtained in controlled test environment to 
relevance in an operational setting needs to be viewed with caution as to 
its applicability and viewed from the proper perspective—from the 
perspective of the ultimate customer, in this case the warfighter. 
• The cost constraints of projects should not be minimalized, which is 
particularly hard to do in schedule-driven projects with urgent 
requirements. 
• The recommendation is easier for the decision maker if all the 
stakeholders are engaged early and often in the process, if their concerns 
are addressed, and if they have some ownership and buy-in in the path 
forward; the PM is key to making this happen successfully through 
effective leadership and communication. 
The intent of the ECH case study is to encourage project management 
professionals to analyze a DOD program. Readers become familiar with the 
evolution of combat helmets, the basics of combat helmet technologies, and helmet 
testing. Readers then can develop alternative strategies in two areas: (1) project 
initiation decision and (2) procurement and fielding decision. In both areas, the 
objective is to enhance critical thinking skills by focusing on the development of 
recommendations that senior leaders and program decision makers can use. 
Understanding the environment and key stakeholder management are critical 
considerations. Leaders can analyze alternative strategies or courses of action 
against decision criteria. 
With respect to the project initiation decision, the setting of requirements in 
the absence of quantitative analysis to underpin realistic values often leads to failed 
defense acquisition efforts, especially important in the current environment with 
limited funding, an emphasis on cost consciousness, intense scrutiny on program 
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cost and schedule overruns, and pressures to field new capabilities to the 
warfighters quickly. Complicating the procurement and fielding decision is 
considerable ambiguity in the interpretation of test results and the need for balance 
between acceptable risk, safety, and protection. 
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Introduction 
Coverage of the return of battle-damaged helmets (as shown in Figure 1) to 
Soldiers is a good news story. It underscores the importance of Soldier protective 
equipment for combat effectiveness and Soldier force protection. Soldiers are 
wearing the very best combat helmets that industry can produce. However, the 
efforts to modernize helmets, and all protective combat gear for that matter, face the 
same defense acquisition challenges that all programs within the Department of 
Defense (DOD) face: a complex, bureaucratic Defense Acquisition institution.1 
The accelerated pace of technology innovation, rapidly evolving threats, and 
declining defense budgets make program management within the DOD challenging 
but even more critical than ever. Defense acquisition operates in an uncertain, 
complex, and ambiguous environment, but maintains a simple focus: develop, 
procure, and field advanced warfighting capability to Soldiers to enable technological 
superiority on the modern battlefield.   
In Figure 1, the photo on the right is a photo taken by U.S. Army Program 
Executive Office (PEO) Soldier of a battle-damaged helmet returned to a Soldier in a 
ceremony at Fort Belvoir in 2016. In news coverage entitled “U.S. Army Soldier 
Reunited with Equipment that Saved His Life in Afghanistan,” the reporter covers the 
Soldier’s description of how his helmet saved his life. The photo on the left is another 
photo taken by PEO Soldier of a recovered helmet damaged by enemy fire in 
Afghanistan.  
                                                          
1 Refer to Appendix 1 for a description of the U.S. Defense Department acquisition institution. 
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Current Situation, Summer 2013 
Monday Morning Project Management Office Staff Meeting: 
Chief Engineer, Project Office for Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment 
(PM SPIE): “Sir, we have an Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH) update. We just 
learned that director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) sent Congress the 
ECH Beyond Low Rate Initial Production (BLRIP) Report, and recommended that 
the Army not buy or field the ECH. The report says the unit cost is too high and that 
Soldiers wearing the ECH would have an unacceptably high risk of dying from 
excessive backface transient deformation from threat bullets.” 
Project Manager, Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment (PM SPIE)2: 
“Hmm, that puts us right in the middle between the warfighters and the operational 
testers. Both Army senior leaders and Congress rely on the independent 
assessment of DOT&E for good reasons. DOT&E has a lot of influence.”  
Chief Engineer: “Yes sir. Also, DOT&E received concurrence from the Army 
surgeon general with their assessments and recommendations.” 
PM SPIE: “So, after a four-year joint development and testing effort with the USMC 
in which the ECH finally passed its requirements, now we have to get an Army 
decision on whether to buy and field the ECH against the recommendations of the 
testing and medical communities, who have legitimate safety concerns?” 
Chief Engineer: “Yes sir. However, the warfighters and Army combat developers 
have been very involved in this effort, and they remain adamant that the ECH should 
be fielded to deploying Soldiers. The requirement remains over 35,000 helmets. The 
USMC is strongly in favor of buying and fielding the ECH as well.” 
PM SPIE: “What’s the funding situation?” 
                                                          
2 Within the U.S. Defense Acquisition, a program manager (usually a U.S. Army officer in the rank of colonel) reports to a politically-
appointed civilian called the Army acquisition executive—the ultimate program decision authority. The director, Operational Test & 
Evaluation (DOT&E) is an independent, politically appointed, senior executive charged with overseeing operational live fire testing and 
reporting directly to the secretary of defense and Congress on program testing. 
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Chief Engineer: “We have over $35 million in operations and maintenance (O&M) 
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding reserved for the buy that must be 
obligated by the end of the fiscal year (FY).” 
PM SPIE: “Okay. Well, you know the drill. DOT&E probably already has the ear of 
the Army acquisition executive (AAE). Because the ECH was a wartime directed 
requirement with high visibility, the AAE is the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). 
Let’s get together a solid briefing to review, and let’s start scheduling the pre-briefs 
to the AAE staff. Also, we need to be prepared to provide the congressional 
committees an update with the Army’s decision. There are many stakeholders 
involved with the ECH, and some will not be happy. So, we need to think about how 
this will play out with the media and senior leaders from all the stakeholders with a 
solid strategic communications plan.”  
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Background 
The protection of American Soldiers in combat remains a top priority for 
senior leaders in the U.S. Army, DOD, and Congress. The DOD has committed 
considerable resources and funding over the years in research and development, 
resulting in advanced materials and manufacturing processes. These investments 
have paid off. The American Soldier going into battle today has technologically 
advanced, rigorously tested combat equipment. Soldiers know that their combat 
equipment works as intended. In the end, this increases the combat effectiveness of 
the Soldiers and their units. One can consider the force protection of Soldiers as a 
layered approach. The outer force protection layer for Soldiers is situational 
awareness. The middle force protection layer is concealment. The inner force 
protection layer is personal protective equipment, like helmets, eyewear, and ballistic 
vests with ceramic plate inserts. This case study centers on combat helmets, which 
provide Soldiers skull and brain protection against both ballistic threats (i.e., bullets) 
and blunt impact forces, and prevent mild traumatic brain injury and concussions. 
Army Combat Helmet Evolution 
Figure 2 graphically displays the evolution of Army combat helmets and 
shows the tradeoff between increased performance and cost over time. The combat 
helmets that Soldiers wear into battle show a constant improvement in performance 
over time. This improvement in performance has been the result of advances in 
material research and manufacturing techniques. Soldiers wore the M1 helmet, 
nicknamed the “steel pot,” from the 1940s through the late 1970s. The M1 provided 
ballistic protection largely because steel is hard. The M1 helmet consisted of a 
pressed manganese steel shell with a webbing suspension that Soldiers fitted to 
their heads. However, the M1 helmet was heavy and uncomfortable, and it provided 
little blunt trauma protection. 
Advances in material research provided the opportunity to increase ballistic 
protection at a reduced weight. The maturation of ballistic fabrics based on para-
aramid polymer technology enabled the Army to replace the M1 with the Personnel 
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Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) helmet in the mid-1980s. The PASGT 
helmets were in the 3- to 4-pound range (lighter than the M1) and provided 
increased ballistic protection. The shell of the helmet consisted of layers of ballistic 
aramid fabric, the most famous of which is DuPont’s Kevlar®. Thus, the PASGT was 
nicknamed simply “Kevlar” or “K-pot.” The ballistic aramid technology allowed 
helmets to provide not only fragmentation protection from explosions but also small 
caliber hand gun protection at a reasonable weight. Eventually, the Modular 
Integrated Communication Helmet (MICH) replaced the PASGT helmet on a limited 
basis. By the mid-2000s, the Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH) was the Army’s 
primary helmet. The basis for both the MICH and ACH is para-aramid polymer 
technology. These helmets provided Soldiers important performance improvements 
like reduced weight and better blunt impact protection through an interior suspension 
system using foam pads versus webbing. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. Army Research Lab, the U.S. 
Army Research Development and Engineering Command, and commercial industry 
teamed up to mature the next generation of ballistics materials, resulting in the 
development of high molecular weight polyethylene (HMWPE) ballistics fibers that 
could be woven into fabrics with application to combat helmets. HMWPE are 
polymer materials with different performance characteristics than para-aramid 
polymer materials. Para-aramids are a thermoset polymer, which means that above 
certain temperatures the polymer breaks down, loses its properties and cannot be 
remolded back into its original state when cooled. On the other hand, HMWPE are 
thermoplastics, which means that above a certain temperature the polymer breaks 
down but it can be remolded into its original state when cooled. The application of 
HMWPE fiber material in helmets created the misperception that helmets made with 
HMWPE materials might easily lose their form under ballistic events and potentially 
jeopardize Soldiers’ safety. Ultimately, the advantages of HMWPE helmets for 
reduced weight and greater ballistic capability outweighed this concern. The basis of 
future Army helmets, both the ECH and its eventual replacement, the Soldier 
Protection System (SPS) Integrated Head Protection System (IHPS), is HMWPE 
technology. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of Combat Helmets
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 8 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Helmet Testing Basics3 
The Army rigorously tests combat helmets worn by Soldiers against protocols 
to ensure they conform to stringent requirements to protect Soldiers against both 
blunt trauma and ballistic threats. Three ballistic properties particularly important for 
describing impacts to helmets are complete penetration (the bullets goes completely 
through the helmet), partial penetration (the bullet does not go completely through 
the helmet) and backface transient deformation (BTD, a measure for the amount the 
round’s impact indents the helmet material). The final performance of the helmet in 
testing and in combat depends both on the inherent properties of the materials used 
to develop the helmet and the processing techniques used to manufacture the 
helmet. Helmet requirements are performance-based requirements. Each helmet 
manufacturer optimizes its design over time using a combination of materials (layers 
of polymer fibers woven into sheets with chemical binders) and different processes 
based on temperature, pressure, and time. The use of statistics is important in 
testing because testing simulates live combat, and the warfighter requires a high 
confidence that the helmets will perform as advertised. The testing must balance the 
need for statistical confidence with the costly and destructive nature of the testing. 
Operational Field Data 
As was presented previously, the Army collects battle-damaged helmets from 
Soldiers. Before returning them, the Army conducts forensic studies to better 
understand enemy threats and analyze the performance of the helmets to improve 
future designs. Figure 3 presents the data collected from combat operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan from 77 helmets hit by small arms bullets. When the bullet 
completely penetrated the helmet, the Soldiers died nearly 75 percent of the time. 
When the bullets did not completely penetrate the helmet (partial penetration), the 
average permanent helmet deformation was about 9mm and the Soldiers all 
survived with relatively minor head/neck injuries and eventually returned to duty. 
                                                          
3 Appendix 2 presents a tutorial on helmet testing. 
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Figure 3. Recovered Protective Helmet Data 
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• 77 useable Helmet engagements collected
– Resulting from Small Arms Fire
– 31 WIA engagements
– 45 KIA engagements
• Analysis: 
– If a helmet stops the bullets, the Soldier has a very 
high probability for survival
– 0% fatality rate for partial penetrations
– For partial penetrations, no serious behind helmet 
blunt trauma reported and no serious neck injuries 
reported
– 73.7% fatality rate for complete penetrations
Acronyms
PHD:       Permanent Helmet Deformation
PP:          Partial Penetration
CP:          Complete Penetration
WIA:       Wounded in Action
KIA:        Killed in Action
Ballistic Results Total # WIA KIA Fatality %
Partial Penetration 16 16 0 0%
Complete Penetration 61 15 45 73.7%
2 WIA instances had complete penetrations with no head injuries 
(not included)
Recovered Protective Equipment Data
AVG PHD Depth 
9.02mm
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Part I: Project Initiation Decision, Early 2009 
Timeframe 
Colonel Bob Smith4 was recently assigned as the project manager (PM), 
Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment—the office responsible for developing, 
testing, procuring, and fielding helmets to Soldiers. Colonel Smith was a seasoned 
defense acquisition veteran with more than 15 years of project management 
experience. During his preparation for this position, the guidance from the 
warfighting community and senior leaders was clear: The top priorities are maximum 
protection and weight reduction.   
Colonel Smith was preparing for a key decision in the Pentagon regarding the 
start of a new helmet program, named the Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH). 
Luckily, Colonel Smith’s chief engineer for the program office, Dr. James Suchez, 
was an armor expert. Dr. Suchez led the efforts to mature HMWPE technologies 
across the DOD and with the commercial industry for the last decade. Dr. Suchez 
explained that the application of HMWPE to helmets allowed the Army to consider 
the following basic options for the new helmet requirements: (1) Maintain the 
protection levels of the current helmets with a reduced weight of up to 20 percent, or 
(2) increase the protection levels but maintain (or increase) the weight of the helmet.  
Colonel Smith knew that the Army senior leaders would rely on the advice 
and recommendations of the PM during the meeting. The final decision would be 
made by the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). However, the AAE would likely turn 
to key stakeholders before making the final decision. The first stakeholder was the 
PM, and Colonel Smith was well prepared to discuss key considerations from a cost, 
schedule, performance, and technology perspective.  
The second stakeholder was the warfighter representative, also called the 
“user” representative. The warfighter representative was a crusty old officer named 
Colonel Billy Johnson from Fort Benning, home of the U.S. Army Maneuver Center 
                                                          
4 The names in this case are fictitious. 
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of Excellence. Colonel Johnson spent most of his time in the Army leading Soldiers 
in combat. Colonel Johnson took his job seriously as the approver of the 
requirements. He was passionate about the possibility for a new helmet because he 
believed that the current helmets were too heavy and uncomfortable. He also 
represented the warfighters currently downrange in combat, and was under extreme 
pressure to approve requirements for a new helmet to protect Soldiers not only 
against fragmentation and handgun rounds, but also against enemy rifle threats.  
Another key stakeholder was Colonel Harry Crisp, the representative from 
DOT&E. Any new helmet development program would fall under DOT&E oversight 
to approve the testing protocols used to ensure the requirements were met. DOT&E 
would also provide an independent assessment of the helmet’s operational 
effectiveness and suitability for Soldiers to Army senior leaders and document that 
assessment in reports to Congress. Colonel Harry Crisp had years of experience as 
a tester and evaluator of Army systems. The importance, influence, and visibility of 
DOT&E’s independent assessment were increased by the recent congressional and 
public concerns calling into question the adequacy of Soldiers’ protective equipment. 
Colonel Smith knew that each of the stakeholders was passionate about a 
new helmet program. He realized that his role as the PM was not to advocate for a 
new program but to give advice about the underpinning technological possibilities; 
additionally, he needed to lay out the cost, schedule, and performance implications 
of various strategies for the development, testing, and procurement of the new 
helmet.  
Two important determinants of program success are requirements definition 
and alignment of those requirements against capability gaps. Simply put, poorly 
defined requirements will set a project’s initial trajectory that will be difficult to fix later 
in the development cycle. Project initiation can be the result of a need from the 
warfighters generically called capability pull. Alternatively, the project might be the 
result of an innovative new technology without a specific identified warfighting 
application generically called technology push. The question of technology push or 
capability pull at program initiation often delays efforts and creates perception 
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challenges among key stakeholders. The ECH effort was driven by the urgent need 
for a new helmet to address protection for Soldiers against rifle threats in combat, 
and was enabled by the maturation of HMWPE technologies. The ECH requirements 
must balance acceptable minimum risk versus maximum safety for protective 
equipment, and weight reduction (Soldier load) versus protection (ballistic and blunt 
force). Colonel Smith knew that this balance would not be an easy compromise for 
any of the stakeholders. 
During the meeting hosted by the AAE, Colonel Johnson was adamant that 
the ECH had to address the rifle threat, be fielded as quickly as possible, and reduce 
the weight on Soldiers in combat. Colonel Smith laid out the basic options that he 
had discussed with Dr. Suchez; the ECH would not be able the address the rifle 
threat and also reduce the helmet weight. Colonel Johnson was not happy, and 
doubted the validity of the technology assessment. He stated that, just a week prior, 
he received an industry brief from a company that claimed they could develop a 
helmet at reduced weights that also addressed increased threats. Dr. Suchez, also 
in attendance, spoke up and said that it was not unusual for industry to make claims 
that they could not back up, and that the application of a new technology into 
helmets is technically challenging from a manufacturing perspective. “It’s one thing 
to produce a prototype helmet in a controlled laboratory,” he said, “but completely 
different to produce many helmets from a manufacturing line that consistently 
perform against rigorous testing requirements.” 
To address the schedule aspect of the program, Colonel Smith next laid out 
the options of pursuing a program of record (PoR) through the deliberate acquisition 
process versus pursuing a rapid acquisition process supported by a directed or 
urgent requirement. Establishing formal ECH PoR would involve a four-year time 
period. Year 1 would allow refinement, analysis, and approval of formal requirement 
documents and the development of testing protocols. Year 1 would also allow the 
Army to request development and procurement funding from Congress in the Army’s 
base budget for the program. Years 2 and 3 would involve development and testing 
of ECH prototypes resulting from competitively awarded contracts (probably cost-
plus type contracts) to be awarded to industry companies. Year 4 would allow the 
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Army to award procurement contracts to the successful companies for the 
manufacture and production of ECHs. Again, Colonel Johnson was not happy that it 
would take four years to get the ECH to Soldiers.  
The alternative to a PoR was to use the rapid acquisition process. In rapid 
acquisition, the Army could write a directed requirement (probably within a month) 
for the ECH, and the Army could award competitive contracts (probably fixed-price 
contracts for certain quantities with production options) to industry within six months. 
A rapid acquisition effort could be funded with Overseas Contingency Operations 
(OCO) money, which was limited to procurement money and no development 
money. Another six months would be required to test the helmets. So, ECHs could 
be on Soldiers in just over a year. Colonel Johnson was much happier with the 
second strategy. But, Colonel Crisp was quick to point out that for the rapid 
acquisition options, the ECH requirements would not be underpinned by analysis, 
and the test protocols would have to rely on the protocols for current helmets 
because there would be no time to develop test protocols specifically for the ECH. 
Colonel Crisp noted this was particularly important for the ECH, which would rely on 
thermoplastic polymers. The ECH based on HMWPE might perform much differently 
than the current para-aramid based helmets. For example, ECHs might lose their 
rigidity after being shot once and offer much less protection from multiple shots. 
Also, the ECH may deform excessively, leading to head trauma and skull fractures. 
There were legitimate testing and safety concerns that would have to be addressed.  
Colonel Smith tried to remain neutral. Both strategies had advantages and 
disadvantages. Decision-making involves defining and analyzing alternative 
approaches. It came down to the level of risk the Army was willing to accept. The 
ECH project initiation decision also encompassed setting future funding levels and 
procurement quantities, as well as addressing industrial base concerns, competition, 
and testing implications. From past experience, Colonel Smith understood that 
stakeholder management would be key to the success of the ECH program and that 
proper communication and collaboration would increase the chances of program 
success. 
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The AAE was pleased with the frank dialogue between the key stakeholders 
and stated that enough information was presented for an informed decision on 
whether or not to initiate the ECH program. Before prioritizing resources for the ECH 
program, the ECH would need to be considered through the lens of the defense 
acquisition institutional framework presented in Figure 4. The PM has cost, 
schedule, and performance responsibilities, and manages the effort with the 
Defense Acquisition Management System. The PM’s official chain of command is in 
the executive branch, but the PM also reports to Congress with program status 
updates and works through contracts with industry. The requirements generation 
system provides requirements and the resource allocation system provides funding. 
Depending on the program, the public and media perceptions may be important 
considerations. 
In this part of the case, program management professionals can compare the 
various courses of actions developed for the initiation of an ECH effort with the 
actual ECH program described below. Valuable insights can be gleaned as lessons 
learned. It may be possible to avoid strategy pitfalls, and project management teams 
may be better able to manage cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs—and 
ultimately deliver capability more successfully. Questions to consider include the 
following: 
• Who are the key stakeholders in the ECH program initiation decision, and 
how does the PM manage their expectations? 
• Would the ECH program be considered a “technology push” or “capability 
pull” program, and what are the implications? 
• How should the ECH requirements be set? Should increased protection or 
weight reduction be emphasized? What is the right balance between 
reductions of Soldier load (combat weight) versus greater Soldier 
protection? 
• How does the Army set testing protocols for the ECH prior to development 
and manufacturing of a helmet based on a new technology?  
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of various acquisition 
approaches for the development, testing, procurement, and fielding of the 
ECH? What are the criteria used to compare the alternative approaches? 
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The ECH Program 
The ECH program began in early 2009. Figure 5 depicts the ECH program 
timeline. The Army and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) approved urgent 
requirements based on combat operations and the need for increased protection 
against enemy rifle threats. The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account 
funded the ECH program. The acquisition procurement objectives were set based on 
the predicted numbers of deploying Soldiers. The Army and USMC set broad 
requirements, including a 35 percent increase in fragmentation protection, increased 
9mm pistol protection, and rifle threat protection—all at the same weight of the ACH. 
The acquisition strategy was a single step development in which competition was 
encouraged among industry manufacturers. The original request for proposal asked 
for each ECH vendor to deliver test data validating their claim that their ECH design 
met the combat helmet test protocols used at the time for the ACH and the new ECH 
requirements for rifle protection. Four vendors submitted proposals. However, only 
one vender’s design was acceptable. At the end of 2009, this vendor received a 
contract to produce ECHs to undergo government developmental testing with 
contract options for production deliveries after successful first article tests (FATs). In 
late 2010, after successful developmental testing, the Army and USMC approved the 
Milestone C to enter into low rate initial production (LRIP) with the selected vendor. 
The LRIP decision permitted the production of a small number of helmets to undergo 
testing in order to validate that the contractor could successfully produce the helmets 
to performance requirements. 
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Figure 5. ECH Program Timeline 
In late 2011, the ECH passed the second round of FAT. To meet an 
aggressive production schedule for the Army and USMC, the ECH vendor submitted 
an engineering change proposal for a second and third production line. It would take 
all of 2012 for the vendor to successfully pass the third round of FAT for all three 
production lines after working through issues between test sites (U.S. Army Test 
Center and National Institute Justice laboratories), as well as issues with the source 
of rifle rounds (Winchester versus Hornady versus Remington). 
The ECH FAT results demonstrated that the ECH met its requirements and 
offered Soldiers the potential for greater protection compared to the ACH. Against a 
requirement for a 35 percent increase in fragmentation protection compared to the 
ACH, the ECH demonstrated an average increase of 53 percent. For the 9mm BTD 
requirements, the ECH demonstrated an average increase in performance of 10 
percent over the ACH performance. Finally, against the chosen test rifle threat, the 
ECH demonstrated an over 153 percent increase in protection over the ACH for 
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resistance to penetration. Of note is the fact that there was no BTD requirement 
against rifle threats for the ECH. The legacy ACH 9mm BTD requirements were too 
restrictive for rifle threats, and there was no basis to assign 9mm BTD requirements 
to rifle threats without injury data, which does not exist. To avoid jeopardizing the 
program due to unachievable or unrealistic requirements, rifle BTD testing occurred 
for government reference purposes only.  
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Part II: ECH Procurement and Fielding Decision, 
Summer of 2013 
After passing FAT and four years after program initiation, in the summer of 
2013, the ECH was ready for a full rate production (FRP) decision, after which the 
ECH would be produced as quickly as possible to the approved acquisition objective 
quantity. Each production lot of helmets would undergo lot acceptance testing (LAT) 
to verify continued compliance to specification requirements. Finally, after passing 
LAT, the Army could field helmets to Soldiers deploying into combat. But, should 
they? 
The FRP decision would involve significant procurement money to buy and 
field the ECH. Despite FAT results in which the ECH demonstrated superior 
performance against the requirements over current helmets, Army leaders, 
specifically the AAE, faced a difficult decision. Not all key stakeholders interpreted 
the test results similarly, raising significant safety concerns for Soldiers. The DOT&E 
issued a congressionally mandated Beyond LRIP Report recommending that the 
ECH not be fielded to Soldiers. DOT&E believed that the cost per helmet (roughly 
two and half times the current helmet) did not justify the minimal performance 
increase. DOT&E was also concerned that the Army did not test the ECH against 
the most stressing or most prevalent enemy rifle threats. Additionally, and more 
importantly, DOT&E stated that Soldiers wearing the ECH in combat would face an 
unacceptable risk of head injuries due to excessive backface deformation caused by 
rifle rounds. The medical community, through the Army Surgeon General, supported 
the DOT&E recommendations. These concerns put the AAE in a difficult position. To 
further complicate matters, the AAE had spoken to DOT&E, who emphatically stood 
behind their recommendation.   
Again, the AAE convened the same Council of Colonels that met four years 
earlier to discuss the decision to initiate the ECH program. Colonel Smith admitted 
the ECH program had not met the original timelines, but emphasized that the ECH 
had finally successfully passed testing and met its performance requirements. 
Colonel Smith also stressed that $35 million was at risk if the procurement decision 
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passed the end of the fiscal year, which was nearing. Colonel Crisp noted that he 
understood the program history well and understood the challenges. However, in 
DOT&E’s opinion, the ECH was not operationally effective or operationally suitable 
for fielding to Soldiers. The risk of injury to Soldiers was unacceptable; in DOT&E’s 
and the Army Surgeon General’s opinion, Soldiers wearing the ECH could suffer life 
threatening skull fractures from excessive BTD from threat rifle rounds. Additionally, 
Colonel Crisp noted that the ECH was not tested against the most stressing threats, 
bringing in question the validity of the requirements. Colonel Johnson was livid that 
there was even a question about the requirements. The entire community and all 
stakeholders had agreed to the original requirements more than four years ago. 
Everyone had accepted the program risks. Now, three years later than planned, 
when the ECH finally passed testing, concerns were raised. Colonel Johnson stated 
that the warfighter community strongly recommended getting the ECH to Soldiers as 
quickly as possible. 
Colonel Smith again tried to remain neutral to avoid the appearance that the 
PM was biased toward buying the ECH. However, he was compelled to provide the 
complete picture to the AAE for the most informed decision. His program office was 
also charged with the collection and analysis of battle-damaged helmets from 
Soldiers who had been shot in the head while wearing their helmets. Analysis of 
those helmets indicated that no Soldiers had died or suffered major injuries as a 
result of excessive backface deformation of the helmet. The average deformation 
observed was 35 percent of the 9mm BTD requirement of 25.4mm (or coincidentally, 
exactly 1 inch). Colonel Crisp interrupted and stated that DOT&E placed no value on 
the results because they were not statistically robust and were not done under strict 
testing conditions where the variables were controlled. Colonel Crisp also pointed 
out that the government’s own reference testing indicated that the BTD observed 
from the test rifle threat was 18 percent to 89 percent higher than the 9mm BTD 
requirement. Colonel Smith concurred with those numbers but indicated that he was 
not finished presenting the rest of the field data results, which indicated that nearly 
74 percent of Soldiers died if the threat round completely penetrated the helmet. 
Again, Colonel Crisp dismissed that data, and again brought up the rifle threat round 
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used in testing. Colonel Johnson asked a question about the operational safety 
margin built into the testing. Colonel Smith replied in the affirmative that the chosen 
rifle round was fired at the ECH at muzzle velocity and at 0 percent obliquity, 
operationally providing Soldiers a safety margin, because in combat, rounds are 
fired at considerable distance, slowing down in flight and striking at non-direct 
angles. Therefore, even though the chosen test round was not the most stressing 
rifle threat round, the ECH still provided considerable protection and 153 percent 
more protection from penetration than the current helmet against the rifle threat. 
The AAE realized that the meeting of the Council of Colonels was probably at 
a point of agreeing to disagree. The AAE understood each of the positions clearly 
and thanked everyone for their candid and articulate input. In light of the data 
presented, should the Army buy and field the ECH? Specifically, the following 
questions should be addressed: 
• Who were the key stakeholders and how would the PM manage their 
expectations?  
• How does the Army balance the importance of development test data 
versus field data from helmets that were battle damaged? Should 
developmental test results or field data carry more weight in decision-
making? How can the same development test data be interpreted 
differently by stakeholders? 
• Are the concerns of the testing and medical communities warranted? 
• How should the Army address these concerns with Congress, the media 
and the American public?   
• What are the advantages, disadvantages, and second order implications 
of various courses of actions for the path forward? What are the decision 
criteria? 
• How do you quantify benefits (such as saving a Soldier’s life) and 
compare these benefits with long-term, potential health problems like 
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Conclusion 
The intent of the ECH case study is to encourage project management 
professionals to analyze a DOD program. After reading and studying the ECH 
program case study data to become familiar with the evolution of combat helmets, 
the basics of combat helmet technologies, and helmet testing, participants can 
develop alternative strategies in two areas: (1) project initiation decision and (2) 
procurement and fielding decision. In both areas, the objective is to enhance critical 
thinking skills by focusing on the development of recommendations that senior 
leaders and program decision makers can use. Understanding the environment and 
key stakeholder management are critical considerations. Leaders can analyze 
alternative strategies or courses of action against decision criteria. 
With respect to the project initiation decision, significant technology 
advancement enabled the consideration of a new helmet like the ECH. The 
maturation of HMWPE technology allowed the Army to consider a helmet that offers 
either similar protection at less weight or increased protection at the same or greater 
weight than current helmets. However, the setting of requirements in the absence of 
quantitative analysis to underpin realistic threshold values often leads to failed 
Defense Acquisition efforts, especially important in the current environment with 
limited funding, an emphasis on cost consciousness, intense scrutiny on program 
cost and schedule overruns, and pressures to field new capabilities to the 
warfighters quickly. Complicating the procurement and fielding decision is 
considerable ambiguity in the interpretation of test results and the need for balance 
between acceptable risk, safety, and protection. 
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Appendix 1. U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution—
Decision Framework 
Within the U.S. Defense Department, the development, testing, procurement, 
and fielding of capability for the warfighter operates within a decision-making 
framework that is complex. Within the private sector, similar frameworks exist. The 
U.S. defense acquisition institution has three fundamental support templates that 
provide requirements, funding, and management constraints. The executive branch, 
Congress, and industry work together to deliver capability, with the PM as the central 
person responsible for cost, schedule, and performance. Figure 6 depicts this 
framework. 
 
Figure 6. Defense Acquisition Institution—Big “A” Acquisition 
The government program manager (PM) is at the center of defense 
acquisition, which aims to deliver warfighter capability. The PM is responsible for 
cost, schedule, and performance (commonly referred to as the “triple constraint”) of 
assigned projects—usually combat systems within the DOD. The PM has a formal 
chain of command in the DOD through the executive branch of government. The PM 
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typically reports directly to a program executive officer (PEO), who reports to the 
service acquisition executive (an assistant secretary for that service—either Army, 
Navy, or Air Force), who reports to the defense acquisition executive (the under 
secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics). Depending on the 
program’s visibility, importance, and/or funding levels, the milestone decision 
authority (MDA) is assigned to the appropriate level of the chain of command. 
Programs within defense acquisition require resources (for funding) and 
contracts (for execution of work) with industry. Congress provides the resources for 
the defense programs through the annual enactment of the Defense Authorization 
and Appropriation Acts, which become law and statutory requirements. The PM, 
through warranted contracting officers governed by the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), enters contracts with private companies within the defense 
industry. Other important stakeholders include actual warfighters, the American 
public, the media, and functional experts (i.e., engineers, testers, logisticians, cost 
estimators, etc.), as well as fiscal and regulatory lawyers. 
As a backdrop to this complicated organizational structure for defense PMs, 
there are three decision support templates: one for the generation of requirements 
known as the Joint Capability Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS), a 
second for the management of program milestones and knowledge points known as 
the Defense Acquisition Management System, and a third for the allocation of 
resources known as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 
(PPBES). Each of these decision support systems is fundamentally driven by 
different and often contradictory factors. The requirement generation system 
(JCIDS) is driven primarily by a combination of capability needs and an adaptive, 
evolving threat. The resource allocation system (PPBES) is calendar-driven by 
Congress writing an appropriation bill—providing control of funding to the Congress 
and transparency to the American public and media for taxpayer money. The 
Defense Acquisition Management System is event-driven by milestones based on 
commercial industry best practices of knowledge points and off-ramps supported by 
the design, development, and testing of the systems as technology matures. Often 
integration and manufacturing challenges occur.  
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Appendix 2. Helmet Testing Basics  
The Army rigorously tests combat helmets worn by Soldiers against protocols 
to ensure they conform to stringent requirements to protect Soldiers against both 
blunt trauma and ballistic threats. Typical battlefield ballistic threats include 
fragments from explosive devices and bullets from handguns and rifles. Within the 
DOD, System Threat Assessment Reports document relevant and existing helmet 
threats, and these threats are validated by the National Ground Intelligence Center 
(NGIC). With respect to fragmentation, the ARL has proven that five fragment 
simulators represent 95 percent of the range of threat fragments Soldiers expect to 
face from exploding munitions. Fragment threats used in testing include the 2 grain 
right circular cylinder (RCC), 4 grain RCC, 16 grain RCC, 64 grain RCC, and 17 
grain fragment simulating projectile (FSP). Hand gun threats include the 9mm full 
metal jacket (FMJ) 124 grain, 0.357 Sig FMJ 125 grain, and the 44 Mag 240 grain. 
These threats are defined by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). Rifle threats 
include eight different rounds to include 5.45mm, 5.56mm and 7.62mm rounds (both 
armor-piercing and non-armor-piercing varieties). 
Helmet testing is a form of destructive testing because the helmets are non-
recoverable after the testing. Generally, testing can focus on physical properties (like 
density or melting point), mechanical properties (like tensile strength or impact 
strength), and ballistic properties. Three ballistic properties particularly important for 
helmets are complete penetration (the bullets goes completely through the helmet), 
partial penetration (the bullet does not go completely through the helmet), and 
backface transient deformation (a measure for the amount the round’s impact 
indents the helmet material). 
Depending on the materials selected and the manufacturing process, each 
helmet will demonstrate a ballistic testing curve, represented in Figure 7. The 
frequency of complete penetration (CP) can be plotted against the striking velocity of 
the round. A striking velocity of V0 is the highest velocity at which no rounds 
completely penetrate the helmet shell. A striking velocity of V100 is the velocity at 
which all rounds completely penetrate the helmet shell. The V50 striking velocity 
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represents the velocity at which 50 percent of the rounds completely penetrate and 
50 percent partially penetrate the helmet. Figure 7 labels the zones of variation and 
non-variation. The variation zone represents a performance area for the helmet in 
which the helmet may provide the different levels of protection but demonstrate the 
same V0 and V100 characteristics. 
 
Figure 7. Ballistic Helmet Testing—Penetration 
V0 is the “protection parameter” because it identifies the warfighter’s 
guaranteed protection level. It is an important parameter in production quality and 
control. However, it does not completely measure material performance and 
depends greatly on the production process. Generally, helmet manufacturers want to 
make the actual V0 demonstrated by a helmet higher than the V0 required to ensure 
a helmet passes testing (see Figure 8). V50 is the “material parameter” because it 
does not represent a guaranteed level of protection but is important in the 
optimization of the helmet design. There is a unique V50 for each helmet design. 
Generally, the design goal is to make V50 as high as possible and as close to V100 as 
possible. 
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Figure 8. Penetration Testing Conclusion 
During ballistic testing, if a bullet only partially penetrates (PP) the helmet, 
testers measure the backface transient deformation (BTD) using calipers or laser 
techniques. The lower the BTD exhibited by a helmet in testing, the lower the 
potential for injuries to the wearer’s head. Figure 9 is a pictorial representation of a 
sample BTD measurement. After a series of tests, testers plot the observed BTDs 
for a helmet. This results in a distribution of values around an average BTD value 
(Figure 10). The lower the average measured BTD compared to the required value, 
the more protection the helmets offer and the greater the testing success rate for the 
design and manufacturer (Figure 10). 
There is an additional important point to understand about helmet testing with 
respect to battlefield operational relevance. In testing, the Army performs V0 
resistance to penetration and BTD testing with the threat rounds fired at the helmet 
at speeds representing threat weapon muzzle velocity and at angles of 0 percent 
obliquity. This represents a worst-case condition that is representative of extremely 
close combat scenarios. Under these conditions, the round strikes the helmet with 
the maximum force and the highest chance for penetration. During combat, 
however, the enemy fires at various distances from their targets. Over these 
distances, bullets slow down and strike their intended targets at various angles. 
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Therefore, in combat, bullets strike Soldier helmets at speeds significantly lower than 
muzzle velocity speeds and from non-perpendicular angles. 
 
Figure 9. Ballistic Testing—Backface Deformation 
 








Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Ingersoll Hall 
Monterey, CA 93943 
    www.acquisitionresearch.net 
 
